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The Chinese regulatory decentralization has evolved since regulation was introduced in 
the transition process. The quota system is an important instrument in China's regulatory 
regimes. Stock issuance quota system for regulating public offerings in securities markets 
is a major example. We argue that under certain conditions quotas can generate proper 
incentives to induce regional governments to cooperate in implementing regulations 
nationwide.  Four groups of evidence are provided that regulatory decentralization in 
China's financial market has created incentives for regional competition and decentralized 
information collection in stock issuance. Weaknesses and limitations of the Chinese 
regulatory decentralization are discussed.  
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It is evident from the growing literature that institutions of protecting property rights and 
regulation to ensure market orders are important determinants of long-term economic 
performance including financial development (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 
2004; and Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The prevailing view emphasizes that legal and 
regulatory institutions should play a primary role in maintaining a market economy, 
whereas the government should be separated from business.  However, despite the fact 
that China has increased its reliance on market forces tremendously since economic 
reforms began almost thirty years ago it has retained considerable state control of the 
national economy (Allen et al., 2005).  
Nevertheless, the mode of state control in the Chinese economy has actually 
changed dramatically. State ownership is dwindling steadily and state planning concedes 
to public regulations. Compared with the pre-reform central planning era, the state has 
been transforming itself from an omnipotent and omnipresent owner of the economy to a 
regulatory body that governs the economy through various regulations such as standard 
setting, permit issuance, supervision, and monitoring.  
The path toward and the function of a regulatory state in China differ 
considerably from those in developed countries. In developed market economies, market 
discipline and private legal action through courts had been the fundamental instruments 
for the functioning of a market economy. The regulatory state emerged only when the 
court-based judiciary system was ineffective for various reasons (Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2003). In contrast, public regulations emerge in China’s transition toward a market 
economy when state ownership of the economy declines but market discipline and rule of 
law are yet to be established. This difference in genesis means that China’s regulatory 
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state retains much more control of the economy than its counterparts in mature market 
economies. In China, a major task of public regulations is to enable markets to develop 
when rule of law is almost absent. 
Built upon weak legal institutions and a decentralized economy, China introduced 
a regulatory decentralization in its public regulation system. The central regulatory 
authorities break down the regulatory tasks and delegate them to regional governments. 
This system has developed from the institutional base of regional decentralization and 
regional competition to help implement national regulatory goals. One important 
instrument of Chinese regulatory decentralization is the quota system. In this study, we 
provide evidence from the Chinese financial market regulation that the quota system 
creates a dynamic incentive scheme.      
China had a very weak legal basis when it began to develop financial markets in 
the early 1990s. Courts were ineffectual and have in fact not played an important role in 
enforcing investor rights to this day. However, China has achieved a remarkable 
development of financial markets with poor formal legal institutions (Pistor and Xu, 
2005). This seems to contradict the conventional wisdom of the law and finance literature 
which demonstrates that law and related governance mechanisms are important 
preconditions for financial market development (La Porta et al., 1998). 
We argue that an administrative governance of Chinese equity markets has 
partially filled the void created by the lack of legal governance in China’s financial 
sector.  And the stock issuance quota system contributed to this administrative regime.  
The quota system enlisted the pre-existing institutions of administrative governance in 
the selection of companies for listing or raising additional equity on a stock exchange. 
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Based on the existing regional competition, it created further competition among regions 
for access to centrally controlled equity market. It tapped into the insider knowledge 
about firms of state bureaucrats. 
We conduct a systematic empirical analysis to demonstrate that regulatory 
decentralization reflected in the stock issuance quota system generates a dynamic 
incentive scheme that encourages regional governments to participate in governing the 
stock markets. Four groups of evidences are provided. First, based on a panel dataset, our 
results suggest that regions with better corporate performance and/or better regional 
economic performance obtained more quotas in subsequent periods. Second, our firm-
level panel data evidence suggests that every thing else being equal listed firms located in 
areas with better regional corporate performance and/or better regional economic 
performance in previous periods received more quota allocations later. This evidence 
mitigates the potential endogeneity problems. The third evidence is the most important. 
We demonstrate that listed firms from regions that disclosed information better were 
rewarded with more stock quotas in the ensuing periods. Moreover, quality of regional 
information disclosure was substantially more important than other factors, such as 
regional corporate/economic performances, in determining how quotas were allocated to 
regions.  These findings suggest that stock issuance quota was exploited as an incentive 
device to induce regional governments to enforce disclosure rule and to select better 
performing firms for initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). 
Finally, our evidence suggests that the majority of IPO firms selected by regional 
governments had been better performing state-owned enterprises before they went public. 
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This seems to imply that the Chinese regulatory decentralization is reasonably effective at 
the IPO stage. 
However, we also point out that the quota system is not a long-term solution to 
financial market regulation. It does not work effectively for non-state-owned firms and 
cannot ensure adequate corporate governance of listed companies. Moreover, in some 
non-financial areas, such as environmental protection and land distribution etc., 
regulatory decentralization in general and the quota system in particular fail to be 
effective. This study also illustrates conditions that the Chinese regulatory 
decentralization works or does not work in general.   
Based on some aggregate data, Pistor and Xu (2005) made an observation that 
administrative governance institutions deployed in Chinese financial markets might have 
helped the growth of Chinese securities markets when the Chinese legal institution was 
terribly weak. However, they did not establish systematic econometric evidence and did 
not address the general issue of regulatory decentralization.  
At an abstract level our work is complementary to Glaeser et al. (2001), which 
argues that under certain conditions regulation is more effective in law enforcement than 
the court system. However, regulatory decentralization studied here is a very different 
institution. Furthermore, in addition to explaining financial regulation in China, our paper 
also makes general points on how the Chinese regulatory regimes work or do not work.  
There is a small but growing literature on the impact of government intervention 
on bank and listed company performances in China. For instance, Fan et al. (2006) 
document that listed companies with politically-connected CEOs typically under-
perform, and the appointment of politically-connected CEOs does not enhance 
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shareholder value. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004) find that China’s state-dominated 
financial system causes regional segmentation of capital markets and misallocation of 
capital resulting from the government’s reallocation of capital from more productive to 
less productive regions. Our findings are not necessarily in conflict with the above 
literature. We have no doubt that government intervention often incurs inefficiency and 
has a negative impact on the performance of banks and listed companies. This is 
particularly true if we compare the cases of state intervention with the first best scenario. 
Indeed, in our paper we point out inefficiencies associated with the quota-based 
regulatory decentralization. However, we argue that in the process of development or 
transition, when the support of legal institutions is too weak, an administrative 
governance system with proper structures could be helpful to preclude substantial 
disorders. In this sense, this system is a second-best solution under various institutional 
constraints.             
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an overview of 
regulatory decentralization in China. Section III gives a detailed account of the stock 
issuance quota system as an administrative governance mechanism in China’s stock 
markets. Sections IV and V provide evidence that the quota system operates as a dynamic 
incentive scheme to regional governments in screening IPOs and SEOs of listed 
companies at the province and firm levels, respectively. Section VI provides further 
evidence that quota allocation depends positively on the quality of regional market 
information. In Section VII, we provide evidence that regional governments tend to select 
better performing state-owned enterprises to be listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. Section VIII discusses problems of the quota-based regulatory regime. 
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Section IX provides some further robustness tests. Section X concludes the paper with 
some further discussions.   
II. Regulatory Decentralization in China 
Regulatory decentralization has been introduced into China in the process of 
transforming the Chinese economy from a centrally planned economy to a market one. 
The Chinese central regulatory agencies typically delegate substantial powers to regional 
governments to enforce regulations in their jurisdictions. It is noteworthy that regulatory 
decentralization or regulatory federalism has existed in countries with a strong rule of law 
for some periods in history. For instance, it dominated the US banking and securities 
markets regulation before 1933, and the current European Union securities market 
regulatory system also bears the features of regulatory federalism.2 The existing literature 
has focused on regulatory decentralization under a strong rule of law and identified 
several advantages: it creates competition among jurisdictions (Tiebout, 1956); it deals 
better with regional heterogeneity than centralized regulation does as illustrated in cases 
such as fiscal federalism (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972); and it generates self-enforcing 
balance rules between federal and regional governments (Weingast, 1997). In contrast, in 
                                                 
2 Since the creation of the US Federal Reserve System in 1913, federalism was implemented in the central 
banking system and banking regulation. The regulation of US securities markets bore a more striking 
federalist structure before 1934. State laws and state enforcement dominated the US financial market 
regulations (Allen and Herring, 2001). Similarly, at present, the European Union (EU) implements a 
securities market regulatory system that is similar to regulatory decentralization. The EU Council issues 
directives setting standards for member state legislation and allows each member state to create its own 
laws in compliance with these directives. 
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China, regulatory decentralization serves primarily as a functional substitute for weak 
formal legal institutions.   
China’s economic reform has been characterized by regional decentralization. 
This provides incentives for regional governments to compete in reforms by linking 
regional government officials’ career paths with regional economic performance 
(Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005). It has also facilitated a regional 
experiment-based reform strategy in China’s economic reform (Qian, Roland and Xu, 
2006).3 Although most of the Chinese regulations are enacted at the national level and 
often officially implemented by the central regulatory agency, regional governments are 
essential to the enforcement of regulations even in cases where there is no regional 
regulatory body.   
Regulatory decentralization in China has evolved from the existing institutions 
inherited from the central planning economy. First, regional governments have been de 
facto owners of SOEs under their jurisdiction since the reform started in the late 1970s 
(Granick, 1991). As owners, regional governments have natural advantages in acquiring 
information from their firms. Second, regional governments have controlled most of the 
regional resources and have played primary roles in fulfilling or implementing 
government functions within their jurisdictions. As a result, the newly evolved regulatory 
regime relies essentially on regional governments’ assistance and cooperation in 
enforcing regulations.  
                                                 
3 Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) claim that one essential precondition for the success of regional 
decentralization in China is that the central government remains strong and is able to make political 
appointments of regional leadership. 
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The quota system is one of the major instruments being deployed by the Chinese 
regulatory decentralization regime. In China’s pre-reform central planning system, the 
state planning authority issued detailed industrial production quotas to SOEs based on the 
material balancing system.4 The following are some major examples of the quota system 
that have been deployed in China’s regulatory regimes. As we explain briefly in the 
following, the quota system worked well in some areas but failed badly in others.  
The bank credit quota system was utilized by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
to control the aggregate money supply until 1998. The PBC formulated the national credit 
plan and allocated credit quotas to the headquarters of all major state banks, which in turn 
reallocated these to their regional branches and subsidiaries.5  The regional allocation of 
bank credit quotas depends largely on the regional banking performance, such as the 
deposits taken by regional banks in the previous year, the regional economic performance, 
                                                 
4 Compulsory quotas were also employed in agriculture. For instance, compulsory grain delivery quotas 
were implemented during 1954-55. The central authority set the absolute level of these quotas and their 
allocation among regions, while the local authority allocated local quotas to each individual peasant 
(Perkins, 1964). 
5 Based on the annual money supply target approved by the central government, the PBC decides the 
national credit plan and allocates credit quotas to all major state banks which reallocate them to their 
regional branches and subsidiaries. The credit quotas are mandatory targets by which banks must abide. 
They are not allowed to issue loans beyond the allotted quota regardless of the sufficiency of their fund 
resources. Thus, the bank credit quota system was a major instrument to contain inflation. On the other 
hand, competition for bank credit quotas has become extremely fierce. In the transition period, regional and 
local governments competed for a larger share of the national bank credit allocation, trying to outperform 
each other so as to be capable of promoting regional development and enlarging their revenue bases (Lu 
and Yu, 2000). 
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and the regional policies of the central government (e.g., policies to promote the 
development of certain regions). The bank credit quota system was a major instrument 
for implementing macroeconomic policies in general and monetary policy in particular 
when market-based credit allocation mechanisms were not yet ready to be deployed.  
Another example of regulatory decentralization is land quota regime, which has 
been adopted to regulate land use.  The major purpose of land regulation is to prevent 
excessively expropriating arable land for non-agricultural usage. To facilitate compliance 
with the land use quota system, regions violating the land use plan will face a deduction 
in future quota allocation together with other penalties. 6 
The quota system is also applied to pollutant emission control. The central 
government first sets the national target of pollutant emissions, and allocates pollutant 
emission quotas to different regions and industries which, in turn, further allocate quotas 
to pollutant-generating sources, which are usually factories. In order to provide incentives 
to regional officials to comply with pollutant emission quotas, the performance in 
fulfilling quotas is taken as part of the criteria for evaluating government officials’ work, 
and regions pay penalties if their pollutant emission exceeds the emission quota (Tian, 
Zhang and Zou, 2004). 
Other examples of quotas include foreign trade quotas, the bankruptcy quotas, and 
workplace safety quotas etc. In this study, we focus on stock issuance quotas in equity 
markets as a central instrument of regulatory decentralization in implementing the 
                                                 
6 The land quota regime does not work effectively that there is rampant violation of land use quotas. It is 
because motivated by expanding regional development zones to attract foreign investment regional 
governments support unlawful occupation of much agricultural land (Ministry of Land and Resources, 
2006). 
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administrative governance of financial markets. In addition to understanding Chinese 
financial market regulation, this study also illustrates conditions that the Chinese 
regulatory decentralization works or does not work in general.  
 
III. Regulatory Decentralization in Chinese Financial Market Governance 
The development of the Chinese financial regulation illustrates the evolution and 
operation of Chinese regulatory decentralization. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
China’s securities markets initially emerged, there was no centralized national market 
regulation, and regulation was carried out by regional governments or regional branches 
of China’s central bank – the People’s Bank of China (PBC). The two stock exchanges 
established in Shanghai and Shenzhen in late 1990 were de jure self-regulatory 
organizations, with limited supervision from the corresponding municipal governments, 
and the central government had only a minimal role (Green, 2004). The regulation of 
securities markets in Shanghai was executed by the Shanghai municipal government and 
the PBC Shanghai branch. The PBC Shanghai branch was responsible for giving 
approval to public offerings. The registration of new companies was subject to the 
consent of the Shanghai municipal government (Fang, 1995). Similar arrangements also 
applied to the securities markets in Shenzhen in the early 1990s (Ma, 2003).  
The quota system of equity share issuance was introduced to the Chinese equity 
market in 1993. Originally, it was designed by the central government to control the size 
of financial markets, to maintain balance among the regions and to preserve the dominant 
position of public ownership. The central government determines the total number of 
shares to be issued in the nation and then allocates stock issuance quotas to regions and 
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ministries. Regional governments in turn allocate quotas to selected SOEs for going 
public through IPOs or to listed companies seeking SEOs. The regional governments 
collect information on these firms and submit it to the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the national regulatory agent. After reviewing the company 
information, the CSRC gives its approval to companies to issue shares in the public 
equity markets. In 1993, the first year when the quota system was in full operation, five 
billion shares were made available at the national level. Individual regions received 
quotas in the amount of 50 million to 500 million shares (Fang, 1995). The quota system 
was officially in place from 1993 to 2000. However, it actually governed financial 
markets up until around 2003.  
It is well understood that financial markets in general and emerging markets in 
particular face severe information problems. In countries with rule of law the problem is 
mitigated by the law-based regulatory regime, of which the mandatory disclosure rule is 
the core, such as the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of the U.S.A. Preconditions for 
the efficacy of the mandatory disclosure rule, however, are absent in China (Pistor and 
Xu, 2005). We argue that the stock issuance quota system de facto served as a primary 
instrument of regulatory decentralization in the regulation of financial markets. 
Specifically, in addition to decomposing regulatory work into regional governments the 
stock issuance quota system also motivated regional governments to collect and corporate 
insiders to reveal firm-specific information. This served as a critical step in information 
disclosure.  
There are three conditions for the quota system to function as an effective 
decentralized regulatory instrument. Firstly, regional governments must have substantial 
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control rights over the regulatory subjects; otherwise regional governments would not 
play a major regulatory role. Concerning financial market regulation, when IPOs were 
restricted to state firms and most listed firms in Chinese financial markets were regional 
SOEs, which were “owned” by regional governments, the first condition is most likely to 
be satisfied. As “owners” of SOEs under their jurisdiction, regional governments are 
better informed than others about “their” firms and thus, they are more capable of 
acquiring information about these firms. Secondly, regional governments must have 
strong self-interests on the regulatory subjects; otherwise regional governments would 
not be motivated to participate. When regional SOEs provided the bulk of financial 
resources for regional governments and when regional officials’ promotion is linked to 
their performance in regional competition, probably the second condition is satisfied. 
Finally, the central government must have direct control over resources to be allocated by 
a quota system; otherwise quota allocation loses its significance in providing incentives.  
The share issuance quota allocation is about financial resources in national markets. 
Hence, this condition is satisfied.   
If the operation of the quota system does provide incentives to regional 
governments to regulate, we expect the size of quota allocations to regions to be 
positively correlated with the past performances of listed companies from the 
corresponding regions. Summarizing the above discussions, we have the following 
hypotheses to be tested in the paper:  
a) Everything else being equal, regions with a better aggregate corporate 
performance (measured for all listed companies in the region) should obtain more stock 
issuance quotas.  
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b) Everything else being equal, firms located in better-performing regions 
(measured by aggregate corporate performance of all listed firms in the region) should 
obtain more quotas.  
c)  Everything else being equal, regions that achieve better information disclosure 
should obtain more quotas.  
 
IV. Data 
The quota allocated to each region from the central government is the total 
number of shares allowed to be issued from the region. However, the data on quota 
allocation are not publicly available. The best proxy we can find for the size of a region’s 
quota is the number of shares issued by firms from different provinces. We assume that 
quota allocation is binding so that the actual number of shares issued from a region 
accurately reflects the quota size that the region has obtained.7  The data on the total 
number of shares issued come from the WISE Information System of the Shanghai 
WIND Company.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the growth rate of quota, and the growth 
rate of the number of shares issued is used as a proxy for it. The reason of doing so is the 
following. First, the growth rate in stock issuance helps control for the variation in the 
size of regional economies. Second, to understand the dynamic incentive effects of the 
quota system, it is most appropriate to look at the changes of quota allocation in response 
                                                 
7 It is well documented that there is excess demand in the corporate sector for the regulatory permission to 
get listed and issue stocks. We realize that in reality there is usually a time lag between quota-allocation 
and the listing or equity issuance of a firm.  
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to changes in regional economic and stock market performance. In order to account for 
the time lag between the allocation of the share issuance quota to a province and the 
actual public offerings, we used three years’ moving average growth rates. Specifically, 
the quota measured as the growth rate in stock issuance for region i in period t is 
calculated as [(total shares of region i in year t) – (total shares of region i in year t-
3)]/(total shares of region i in year t-3), where t ranges from 1995 to 2003. 
We use two groups of indicators to gauge corporate performance. One category of 
indicators measures the market performance of listed companies, including the market 
capitalization of total shares of listed companies, the market capitalization of tradable 
shares, the P/E (price to earning) ratio, the P/B (price to book) ratio, and the turnover 
ratio. The other category of indicators hinges on the accounting book-based corporate 
performance measures such as net profits and earnings per share. The data on the market 
and accounting book-based performance indicators come from the WISE Information 
System of the Shanghai WIND Company.  
In addition to the two groups of indicators, we also employ various regional 
economic performance measures as potential determinants of quota allocation. They 
include variables such as GDP per capita, total trade value, industrial output, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), tertiary industry output value, proportion of college graduates in 
the population, and investment in innovation activities. The data on these variables come 
from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.  
Furthermore, in measuring regional market information quality, we utilized 
various types of data. As China’s stocks trade on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, we use the returns on the Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen 
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Component Index as market indices, obtaining the weekly data from the website 
www.yahoo.com.cn. We also use the US and Hong Kong stock market returns adjusted 
by their respective exchange rates with the Chinese currency, RMB, to capture the 
impacts of external stock markets on the Chinese domestic markets. The data on US and 
Hong Kong weekly stock market returns and exchange rates against the RMB are derived 
from the Datastream dataset. 
Summary statistics of some major variables are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
V. Methodology and Estimation  
To investigate whether quota allocation is used as a regulatory instrument, that is, 
whether quota allocation to a region is affected by the performances of that region, we 
conduct four types of statistical analysis.  
5.1. Regional Corporate and Economic Performances vs. Regional Quota Allocation   
If regional quota allocation is used by the national regulator as an incentive 
mechanism to induce regional governments to cooperate in regulating the stock issuance 
of regional listed companies, we expect to observe that regions with better performing 
listed firms obtain more quotas for future stock issuance. To test our hypothesis, we form 
a panel dataset consisting of a time series of nine years (1995-2003) of a cross-section of 
31 Chinese provinces and province-level municipalities.8 We then conduct panel data 
regressions to discover how regional corporate and economic performance affects the 
stock issuance quota allocation among regions. Regressions are estimated by controlling 
                                                 
8 If we stretch the beginning year of the sample to 1994 or 1993, the calculation of quotas requires data on 
shares issued in 1991 or 1990. However, very few provinces were allowed to put firms onto stock 
exchanges at that time so we cannot conduct a meaningful statistical analysis for those years.  
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for both province fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects regression model is 
specified as  
yit  = αi + γt + β′ Xi,t-1 + εit,     (1) 
where yit is the growth rate of quota allocation for province i in year t; αi is province-
specific fixed effects; γt  is year fixed effects; Xi,t-1 is a vector of regional performance 
indicators that is lagged for one year behind the dependent variable; and εit is a random 
error. Our null hypothesis is that β is significantly larger than zero.  
For the purpose of checking robustness, we also test our hypothesis by running a 
random effects regression model, which takes the form  
 yit  = θ + ui + γt + β′ Xi,t-1 + εit,                                               (2) 
where ui is the random disturbance characterizing the i-th province and is constant 
through time (random effects). For brevity, we relegate all the random effects regression 
results to the Appendix that is available on request.  
We construct four groups of performance indicators in the regressions. The first 
group is regional corporate market performance indicators. For each region we calculate 
regional aggregate market capitalization of total stock shares and that of tradable shares. 
We also calculate regional average values of the P/E ratio, the P/B ratio, and the turnover 
ratio of all listed companies in the region. Based on those, we construct three-year 
moving average growth rates as market performance indicators. The second group 
consists of regional corporate accounting performance indicators, which are growth rates 
of regional average net profits and earnings per share of all listed companies in each 
region. Moreover, to investigate the comprehensive impact of regional corporate 
performance on regional quota allocation, we construct three performance indices: the 
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overall performance index as the simple average of all the market and accounting 
performance indices; the corporate market performance index as the simple average of all 
the market performance indices; and the corporate accounting performance index as the 
simple average of all the accounting performance indices. The final category is regional 
economic performance indicators. This group of indicators includes growth rates of 
regional GDP, trade/GDP ratio, FDI/GDP ratio, and industrial value/GDP ratio. Among 
the four indicators, GDP growth and industrial value growth are the most direct measures 
of output growth. Because foreign trade and foreign direct investment are widely 
documented to be a powerful engine of economic growth in China, these two variables 
should accurately reflect regional economic growth performance. 
Employing fixed effects estimation for our panel data helps us to mitigate the 
concern over the omitted-variable bias in regression analysis. It is possible that we have 
not explicitly recognized the effects of omitted variables that are correlated with the 
included explanatory variables. If the effects of these omitted variables remain constant 
for a given region through time or are the same for all regions in a given time period, our 
fixed effects regression specification controlling for region and year fixed effects can 
capture the effects of region-invariant and time-invariant variables (Hsiao, 2003).  
5.2. Regional Corporate and Economic Performances vs. Firm-level Quota 
Allocation 
The stock issuance quota for a region is finally realized by the number of shares 
each listed company in the region issued. If the quota system works as an incentive 
scheme for regional governments, individual companies located in regions with better 
regional performances would obtain more stock issuance quotas than similar companies 
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located in other regions. Furthermore, the firm-level quota analysis helps us to mitigate 
the endogeneity problem, Given that each province has a sufficiently large number of 
listed companies it is unlikely that the quota allocation to any individual company can 
affect the average performance of all listed companies in the whole region. It is even 
more unlikely that the quota allotment to any individual company is able to affect the 
regional economic performance such as GDP growth.     
As with the regional quota measure, we use the growth rate of the number of 
outstanding shares for each firm over three years as the firm-level quota allocation. To 
incorporate the stock issuance from both IPOs and SEOs, we set the number of shares of 
each listed company in the year prior to the IPO year at zero. Correspondingly, we 
calculate the growth rate in the number of shares for firm j in region i in year t as (total 
shares of firm j in region i in year t – total shares of firm j in region i in year t-3)/total 
assets of firm j in region i in year t-3, where t ranges from 1995 to 2003.  
We form a panel dataset consisting of a time series of nine years (1995-2003) of a 
cross-section of 1148 Chinese listed companies.9 Regressions are estimated by 
controlling for firm fixed effects and firm random effects. The fixed effects regressions 
are specified as  
yjit  = αj + γt + β′ Xi,t-1 + εit,                (3) 
where j is the firm, i is the province, t is the year, αj  is the firm-specific fixed effects, γt  is 
year fixed effects, and εit is a random error. The random effects model was specified as 
yjit  = θ + uj +vi + γt + β′ Xi,t-1 + εit , where ui is the random disturbance characterizing the 
                                                 
9 This is an unbalanced panel dataset, as many firms started IPO in a year later than 1995. We ended up 
with 5664 firm-year observations. 
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j-th firm and is constant through time (firm-specific random effects); vi indicates the 
province-specific fixed effects; γt is the constant year effects; θ is a constant term; and εit 
is a random error. The major independent variable, Xi,t-1 , is the same as that in equation 
(1), that is, it is a vector of regional performance indicators that are lagged by one year 
than the dependent variable.  
5.3. Regional Market Information Quality vs. Regional Quota Allocation 
Our main argument for the strength of the quota system is that it provides 
incentives to regional governments to tap into the companies under their jurisdiction and 
to improve the disclosure of firm-specific information. If this is true, we expect that those 
provinces which had a better quality of stock market information disclosure should be 
rewarded with larger stock issuance quota allocations in subsequent periods. Similarly, 
those companies from the regions with better stock market information disclosure should 
be rewarded with larger stock issuance quota allotments in subsequent periods.  
To measure regional market information quality, we adopt the methodology of 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) by measuring the synchronicity of stock price movements 
in each province or the average magnitude of firm-specific variation in stock returns in 
each region. A higher degree of synchronicity of stock price movement indicates a 
smaller amount of firm-specific variation in stock returns, and thus, a lower level of 
information content of stock prices. Since we are interested in investigating the effects of 
the average level of market information quality of listed companies in each region on the 
quota allocation to listed companies in that region, we need to calculate the regional 
average synchronicity of stock price movement. To do this, we begin by assessing the 
synchronicity of individual stock i in year t. We use the following model: 
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rjt = αj + β1j rmtShanghai + β2j rmtShenzhen +β3j[rUS,t + eUS,t] +β4j[rHK,t + eHK,t]+ εjt,      (4) 
where rjt is firm j’s return in period t; rm,tShanghai and rmtShenzhen are Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock market index returns in period t, respectively; rUS,t and rHK,t are US and Hong Kong 
stock market returns, respectively, eUS,t and eHK,t are the rates of changes in the exchange 
rates between RMB and the US dollar or Hong Kong dollar, respectively. rUS,t + eUS,t and 
rHK,t + eHK,t translate U.S. and Hong Kong stock market returns into RMB units 
respectively. εjt is the disturbance term. For each year, we use the weekly data on 
individual stock returns, stock market returns and exchange rate change to conduct 
regressions. From this regression for firm j in year t, we obtain Rj2 and SSTj. A higher 
value of Rj2 means a higher degree of synchronicity of stock price movement for firm j, 
that is, a larger proportion of firm j’s stock return movement is driven by the market 
factor rather than the firm-specific factor. Following this method, we derive R2 and SST 
for all companies from one particular province i. First, we calculate regional R2i, which 
measures stock co-movements for listed firms of province i in year t, 
Ri2=(∑jRji2*SSTji)/(∑jSSTji),    (5) 
and national R2N, which measures stock co-movements for all listed firms in the nation in 
year t, 
RN2=(∑jRj2*SSTj)/(∑jSSTj).     (6) 
Next, we calculate the relative regional stock price co-movement indicator, which is the 
difference between regional Ri2 and national average RN2. The larger the value of this 
indicator is, the lower the market information quality of that region.  
To investigate how regional market information quality affects regional quota 
allocation, we conduct two types of regression analysis. First, we examine the effects of 
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the relative regional stock co-movement indicator on regional stock quota allocation by 
employing a panel dataset that consists of a time series of seven years (1997-2003) of 31 
Chinese provinces and municipalities. As before, we carry out both fixed effects and 
random effects regressions. The regression specifications are similar to equation (1), 
except that the major independent variable, Xi,t-1, is the lagged three-year average of the 
relative regional stock price co-movement indicator. Second, we conduct regressions to 
examine the impacts of regional market information quality on individual firms’ quota 
allocation in that region. The regression specifications are similar to equation (2), except 
that the major independent variable is the lagged three-year average of the relative 
regional stock price co-movement indicator.   
 
VI. Results 
6.1. Evidence on Regional Performance vs. Regional Quota Allocation  
Table 1 presents the results of the fixed effects regression model (1).10 The cross-
region evidence suggests that quota allocation to all Chinese provincial regions was 
affected by the performance of listed firms in those regions and also by the macro 
performance of those regions. In all the regressions of Table 2, the dependent variable is 
the growth rate of the regional stock issuance quota.   
Panel 1 of Table 1 presents the results of the corporate performance impact on 
quota allocation. The independent variables of the regressions are market-based and 
accounting book-based regional corporate performance indicators. We found that all 
                                                 
10 Results of random effects regression are qualitatively the same as what we reported here. They are 
available upon request. The same is true for the results of Tables 3-5. 
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regional corporate performance indicators, such as the growth rates of market 
capitalization, of market turnover, and of net profits, produced positive and statistically 
significant effects on regional quota allocations. Take the result in column (2) as an 
example. A 10% increase in the growth rate of regional tradable market capitalization 
raised the growth rate of regional stock issuance by 1%. Qualitatively, the same is true 
for accounting indicators. For instance, column (6) suggests that a 10% increase in the 
growth rate of net profits for listed firms in a region increased the regional quota flow by 
1.7%.  
In Panel 2 of Table 1, we first look at the impact of the aggregate regional 
corporate performance indices on quota allocation. Consistent with our expectation and 
the panel 1 results, the performance indices, that is, the market performance index, the 
accounting performance index, and the overall performance index, all produced 
consistently positive and statistically significant effects on the region-level flow of 
quotas. For example, our results suggest that a 10% increase in the regional overall 
corporate performance index drove up the regional flow of quotas by 0.15%.   
Finally, we examine the impact of provincial macro performance on quota 
allocation. We find that growth in regional GDP and FDI had strong positive impacts on 
regional stock quota allocation. For example, the results of column (4) suggest that a 10% 
increase in regional GDP growth rate raised the regional flow of quotas by 31.4%. 
Nonetheless, the growth in trade and industrial value did not produce statistically 
significant positive effects on quota allocation.  
6.2. Evidence on Regional Performance vs. Firm-level Quota Allocation  
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Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the firm fixed effects regression model (3), 
which is the cross-region evidence based on firm-level data. The evidence suggests that 
the quota allocation to listed firms was affected by the performances of the region in 
which the firm is located.  
Panel 1 of Table 2 presents results on how regional performance measured by 
market indicators and accounting indicators affects the firm-level quota allocation. Quite 
strong and consistent evidence is found that every thing else being equal listed firms from 
regions having stronger market and accounting performance indicators are rewarded with 
a larger quota of stock issuance in subsequent periods. For example, the estimation in 
column (4) of panel 1 suggests that a 10% growth in the regional P/B ratio raised the 
individual company stock issuance by 0.049% over three years. Similarly, according to 
column (7), a 10% growth in the regional average earnings per share raised the individual 
company stock quota by 0.044%.  Evidence presented in columns (1)-(3) of panel 2 
further confirms these findings. The results verify that firms from regions with stronger 
regional corporate performances were allocated larger quotas in stock issuance in 
subsequent periods.  
Moreover, the regional macroeconomic performance also positively affects the 
quota allocation to individual companies from the region. Columns (4)-(7) of panel 2 
present firm fixed effects regressions of firm-level quotas on regional economic growth 
variables. Clearly, companies from regions that had higher growth rates in GDP, trade, 
FDI, and industrial production were able to obtain larger quotas in stock issuance. 
Column (4) shows that a 10% increase in the regional GDP raised the firm-level flow of 
quotas by 1.6%; and according to column (7), a 10% growth in the regional industrial 
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value/GDP enhanced the quota allocation to individual companies from the region by 
1.5%.  
Conceivably, the firm-level stock issuance quota, especially in the post-listing 
stage, may also be affected by the firm’s own performance. To further differentiate the 
impacts of regional corporate performance and firm-level corporate performance on firm-
level quota allocation, we introduce in Table 3 both regional performance indicators and 
firm-level performance indicators. We use the growth rate of each firm’s net profits as a 
representative indicator of the firm-level corporate performance in all the regressions.11 
Because some companies have not been listed for long enough to warrant a calculation of 
the three-year growth in net profits, the sample size for this study shrinks to 864.   
Panel 1 of Table 3 presents regressions of firm-level quotas on regional corporate 
performance indicators and the firm-level corporate performance indicator by controlling 
for firm fixed effects. Apart from one regional corporate performance indicator, the 
growth in regional earnings per share in column (7), all other regional performance 
indicators produced statistically significant and positive impacts on firm-level quota 
allocation. The growth in a firm’s net profits, as expected, also produced positive and 
statistically significant effects in almost all regressions.  
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 3, panel 2, we present the firm fixed effects 
regressions of firm-level quotas on the regional corporate performance indices after 
controlling for the firm-level corporate performance. The regional corporate performance 
                                                 
11 By using alternative firm level corporate performance indicators, such as the growth rate in total income 
and EBIT, etc., we obtained qualitatively similar results. Thus they are not reported but they are available 
on request.  
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indices produced consistently statistically significant positive effects on firm-level 
quotas, while the firm-level corporate performance measure also revealed a consistently 
positive and statistically significant impact. Finally, as shown in columns (4)-(7) of Table 
3, panel 2, fixed effects regressions were conducted to examine the effects of regional 
macroeconomic performance on the firm-level quota allotment after controlling for firm-
level corporate performance. Apart from the ratio of trade value to GDP, all of the macro 
performance indicators, that is, the three-year regional growth rates in GDP, FDI/GDP, 
and industrial value/GDP, exerted positive and statistically significant impacts on the 
firm-level stock issuance quotas. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on GDP 
growth is clearly much larger than those on the other regional macro performance 
measures.12   
Interestingly, as shown in both panels of Table 3, the magnitude of the effects of 
regional performance is consistently much greater than that of the firm-level performance 
indicator. This finding further confirms our suggestion that the regional economic 
performance is a major factor which determines quota allocation. Take column (1) in 
panel 2 as an example. A 10% growth in the overall regional performance index raised a 
firm’s quota by 0.062%, while a 10% growth in the firm’s own net profits increased the 
firm’s stock quota by only 0.0021%. Similarly, according to column (4), a 10% growth in 
GDP added to the individual firm quota by 1.5%, whereas a 10% growth in the firm’s 
own net profits raised the firm’s stock quota by only 0.0037%. This suggests that in 
                                                 
12 For example, based on column (4), a 10% growth in the regional GDP over three years caused individual 
companies in the region to obtain 1.5% more quota allocation, whereas according to column (6), a 10% 
growth in the regional FDI/GDP raised the quota allocation to regional companies by only 0.36%. 
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regulatory decentralization, regional performance is a primary determinant of firm-level 
stock issuance quota allocation. Most regions tend to allocate larger stock issuance quotas 
to better performing companies. However, only those regions with better regional 
corporate performances and better regional macro performances are able to obtain more 
stock issuance quotas from the central government and in turn allocate these to the listed 
companies under their jurisdiction.  
6.3. Evidence on Market Information Quality vs. Quota Allocation 
The key to financial regulation is information disclosure. Thus, the basic 
hypothesis that we want to test in this subsection is that, everything else being equal, 
those provinces with a better quality of stock market information disclosure are rewarded 
with a larger stock issuance quota allocation. Table 4 presents regression results on how 
regional stock market information quality affects stock quota allocation to regions and to 
individual firms. Here, information quality is measured by the relative regional stock 
price co-movement indicator, which is the difference between the regional Ri2 (see 
equation (5)) and the national average RN2 (see equation (6)). The larger the value of this 
indicator is, the lower the market information quality of that region.  
In panel 1, columns (1) and (2) look at the regional quota allocation. In column 
(1), we only control for year fixed effects, whereas in column (2) we control for both 
province fixed effects and year fixed effects. All regressions produce strong evidence that 
regions with higher relative regional stock price co-movements tend to receive a smaller 
quota allocation. Moreover, the impact is economically quite significant. For instance, 
based on column (2), if a region has a three-year average R2 10% higher than the national 
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average, the stock issuance quota allocated to that region will be lowered by 79.4% in the 
subsequent three years.   
Columns (3)-(5) present the firm-level regression results with different regression 
specifications. In column (3), we only control for the province and year fixed effects, 
whereas in column (4), we also control for industry fixed effects in addition to the 
province and year fixed effects.13 In column (5), we conduct firm fixed effects 
regressions. The estimation results show consistently and strongly that listed companies 
in those regions with higher relative regional stock price synchronicity obtain smaller 
quota allocations in the subsequent periods. Everything else being equal, a company in a 
region with an R2 10% higher than the national average, based on the estimates in column 
(5), would receive a stock quota allocation 4.9% less than a company in a region with a 
national average R2.    
Panel 2 shows the results of our investigation into whether the relative regional 
stock price co-movement indicator continues to significantly affect the firm-level quota 
allocation after controlling for regional corporate or economic performance indicators 
and firm-level corporate performance indicators. Some selected regressions are presented 
in which we employ the overall regional corporate performance index and the three-year 
provincial growth rate in GDP, trade/GDP, FDI/GDP, and industrial value/GDP to assess 
regional performance. We also adopt the three-year growth rate in a firm’s net profits to 
gauge firm-level corporate performance. The regressions show that the relative regional 
stock price co-movement indicator produces consistent and statistically significant 
                                                 
13 Owing to data restrictions the sample sizes for regressions in column (4) controlling for industry fixed 
effects are smaller. 
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negative effects on firm-level stock quota allocation, and its estimated coefficient remains 
stable, at around -0.18 to -0.21. The overall regional corporate performance index, the 
provincial GDP growth rate, and the provincial trade/GDP growth rate no longer exert 
statistically significant effects on firm-level quota allotment, but the regional growth rates 
in FDI and industrial value remain statistically significant. The firm-level operational 
performance indicator consistently produces statistically significant positive effects.  
It is also striking that the impact of regional market information quality has a 
much greater magnitude than those of regional corporate or macro performance and that 
of firm-level corporate performance. Column (4) shows that an increase of 10% in FDI 
inflow raised the firm-level quota allotment by 0.2%, and a rise of 10% in a firm’s net 
profits drove up the firm’s quota by 0.0025%. However, a 10% reduction in the regional 
stock price co-movement indicator increased the stock issuance quota allocation to a firm 
in the region by 1.8%.            
Overall, our statistical analysis demonstrates that those regional governments who 
are more effective in supervising listed companies under their jurisdiction to disclose 
better are rewarded with a larger number of stock issuance quotas. As a result, the listed 
companies in those regions also receive a larger firm-level stock issuance quota.   
6.4. Evidence on Regional Governments’ Selection of SOEs to Go Public 
We argue that the quota system is a de facto incentive scheme which induces regional 
governments to enforce regulation within their jurisdictions. In the previous subsections 
we have tested the determinants of regional quota allocation that future quota allocation 
to a region is linked to the performance of the listed firms from that region. Given the 
scarcity of quotas, if the incentives provided by the quota system are effective the 
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regional government should select better-performing firms in the pre-listing stage to go 
public in order to obtain more quotas in later periods. 
To investigate how regional governments selected companies to go public, we 
compare the pre-listing performance of listed companies with that of other firms.  It is 
noteworthy that more than 80% of all listed firms were SOEs before they went public. 
Moreover, for the period of our study, most non-state firms were not eligible to go public. 
Therefore, in our comparison we focus on the SOEs.  
Through an extensive search of provincial yearbooks, we have collected firm-
level corporate performance data for fifteen provincial regions and qualitative firm-level 
corporate information for another eight, but we have failed to find data for the remaining 
nine provincial regions.14  The quantitative corporate performance data include industrial 
output value per worker, total sales per worker for each enterprise, or the ranking of 
enterprises in terms of total sales, profits, and tax contributions, etc. For each of the 
fifteen provinces/municipalities, we conduct the following logistic cross-section 
regressions to see how SOE performance characteristics contribute to the likelihood of 
                                                 
14  There is no information for the province of Guangdong as a whole; we only have information for 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the two major cities in Guangdong. These two cities presumably have the 
largest number of SOEs in Guangdong province. Chongqing had not become a province-level municipality 
until March, 1997; before 1997, Chongqing was a provincial city under the jurisdiction of Sichuan 
Province. Similarly, we can only obtain city-level information from Baotou of Inner Mongolia and 
Changchun of Jilin province. Baotou is the most important industrial city in Inner Mongolia, and 
Changchun, as the capital city of Jilin province, is also the largest industrial hub of the province. In this 
sense, examining the SOE selection in these two key cities can still provide a good picture of the two 
provinces. 
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being chosen to be listed, Yi = α0 + β1 Xi + I’ β2 + εi , where the dependent variable Yi is a 
binary variable taking value one if the firm finally got listed and zero otherwise. Xi  is the 
quantitative performance indicator of firm i. I is a vector of industry dummies. α0  is 
constant term, and εi is random error term.  
Panel 1 of Appendix Table 2 presents a summary of regression results for these 
fifteen provincial regions. The panel lists the firm-level performance variables and gives 
a qualitative summary of regression results.15 For twelve out of the fifteen regions, the 
independent variables are pre-listing corporate performance indicators. All regression 
results are positive and significant, which suggests that better performing firms had a 
greater chance of being selected to go public. The independent variables for the 
remaining three regions are the pre-listing rankings of corporate performance. 
Consistently, all regression results for these are negative and significant, which implies 
that the higher ranked firms (with smaller ranking numbers) have a significantly higher 
chance of being chosen to go public. Panel 2 of Appendix Table 2 shows the logistic 
regressions for the case of Shanghai as an illustrative example, whereas we relegate the 
regression results of the remaining fourteen regions to the Appendix that is available 
upon request.  
In panel 3, we give a summary of the evidence on the eight provincial regions for 
which we have qualitative information on pre-listing performances. The data show that 
                                                 
15 The quota system requires latest three years’ performance data for any IPO applicant. Given most firms 
in our dataset went public later than 1997 whereas the performance data we collected were published 
before the quota system was introduced (1993) most of our data are immune from potential ‘repackaging’ 
distortions during the IPO process. 
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the majority of the predecessors of listed firms from four out of eight regions, namely 
Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hainan, and Tianjin, had obtained awards such as “model 
enterprise” or “excellent enterprise” many years before they went public. In the 
remaining provinces it is found that there are more than a quarter of the predecessors of 
listed firms which obtained such awards. This suggests that these regional governments 
tended to select better performing firms under their jurisdiction to go public.      
 
VII. Issues that the Quota-based Regulatory Decentralization Cannot Address 
So far, we have demonstrated that the quota-based regulatory decentralization served as a 
reasonably effective governance device to solve the information disclosure problem. 
However, the quota system was taken because there was no better alternative regulatory 
regime when legal institution was very weak in China. Moreover, quota system does not 
always work automatically.  Indeed, it has failed to address a variety of regulatory issues. 
First, the quota system would not work for the IPOs of non-state firms because of a 
violation of the first condition for the quota system to work (Section 3): regional 
governments have limited access to the corporate information of non-state firms since 
these firms are not “owned” or managed by the regional governments. In this situation, 
the quota system used as an incentive method for regional governments becomes 
redundant. Indeed even without purposely designed policy the quota system would lead 
to the dominance of formally state-owned firms in public offerings. This is because 
regional governments are naturally inclined to support SOEs under their jurisdiction and 
select them to go public, given that they have a greater interest in them and have better 
access to information about their performance. 
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Second, the dynamic incentive effect of the quota system does not work well in 
regulating firms at the post-listing stage. The incentives provided by the quota system are 
too weak to preclude financial frauds; and the likelihood and severity of punishment for 
violations are not high enough within a weak law enforcement environment. Moreover, 
after going public the regional governments are no longer the “owner” of the listed firms. 
As a result regional governments became less informed about the firms and were in a 
weaker position to intervene in the management of the firms. These consist of a 
combination of violations of conditions one and two. All of these factors led to the 
declining efficacy of the quota system in the post-listing stage. When the benefits of 
withholding or manipulating corporate information are sufficiently large to an individual 
listed company, the management of the company may take the risk of violating 
information disclosure rules.  As a result the quota system is not able to ensure the 
continuous disclosure of corporate information or preclude market manipulation.   
The detected violations of information disclosure rules by listed companies have 
become rampant in recent years. Summarizing data collected by the CSRC, Appendix 
Table 3 indicates that more than 90% of all detected violations by firms listed in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were related to the violation of post-listing 
disclosure. This illustrates that the quota-based regulatory system is weaker in regulating 
post-listing firms than pre-listing firms.  
 
VIII. Robustness Tests 
8.1. Alternative Measures of Quota 
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We have been using the three-year growth rates in the number of shares issued to 
measure the quota for the region and the firm. This captures the quota approval and stock 
issuance under the quota system. Because we use the actual number of stocks issued as a 
proxy for quota allocation, and because there is typically a time lag between quota 
allocation, listing approval, and the actual issuance of stocks, our quota measure, based 
on three-year growth rates, allows for enough time lag so as to reduce the discrepancy 
between quota approval and the actual stock issuance.   
To discover whether our results are sensitive to the way we construct approximate 
measures of quota, we try alternative measures of quota by varying the length of the 
period in calculating the growth rate in stock issuance. For instance, we define a quota as 
the year-on-year growth rate or two-year growth rate in the number of shares issued. Our 
basic conclusions remain unchanged. In Appendix Table 4, we present several 
representative regression specifications defining the firm-level quota as the year-on-year 
growth rate in the shares issued. As is shown, the conclusions drawn from this alternative 
quota measure remain largely qualitatively equivalent to those derived from the three-
year growth rate measure of quota. We have relegated a complete list of tables adopting 
this alternative quota measure to the Appendix, which is available upon request.  
8.2. Dealing with the Potential Time Series Correlation 
Quota allocation for a region or a firm may exhibit potential time series correlation within 
groups. To see whether this is truly a concern that we need to address, we first examine 
whether there is significant within-group (i.e., within-region or within-firm) time series 
correlation in the panel dataset for both region-level and firm-level regression analysis. 
We re-run the fixed effects and random effects panel data regressions with an AR(1) 
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disturbance term correction. Based on these regression results, we calculate the Bhargava 
et al. (1982) modified Durbin-Waston statistics. We find that the value is typically about 
0.60 in our regressions, which is far below the critical values provided by Bhargava et al. 
(1982). So there is no way to reject the null hypothesis that the autoregressive coefficient 
is zero. We therefore rule out the necessity of using the AR(1) disturbance term in our 
fixed effects or random effects panel data regressions.  
However, to further ensure that the potential within-group time series correlation 
will not affect our results, we adopt one standard econometric technique by correcting the 
standard errors in panel data regressions by clustering around region or firm groups. Most 
of the results remain intact. In Appendix Table 5, we present some selected estimation 
results with standard errors clustered around firm groups. Clearly, the results are 
qualitatively equivalent to the earlier ones, that is, the regional corporate, macro and 
information disclosure performance consistently produce positive and significant effects 
on the firm-level quota allocation. For a more complete list of tables, please refer to the 
Appendix that is available upon request. 
8.3. Controlling for More Region-level Determinants of Stock Issuance Quotas 
To further alleviate the concern over omitted variable bias, we control for some more 
potential regional determinants of stock issuance quota allocation. So far, we have 
focused on the most direct measures of regional corporate or macro performance. If the 
stock issuance quota allocation is efficient and rational so that better performing regions 
obtain more quotas, we expect to see that some more indirect but more fundamental 
determinants of quota allocation may be at work too. We consider three types of potential 
determinants: (1) the indicator of economic structure in a region; (2) the indicator of 
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human capital endowment in a region; and (3) the indicator of technology progress in a 
region. We use the three-year growth rate in the proportion of the output value of tertiary 
industry in GDP to measure the transformation of the economic structure in a region. A 
higher growth in the share of tertiary industry value in GDP means a more rapid 
upgrading in the regional economic structure. We employ the three-year growth rate in 
the proportion of college graduates in the population as an indicator of human capital 
endowment in a region. A higher growth in college graduates in the population indicates 
an accelerated accumulation of talent and human capital in a region. We utilize the three-
year growth in investments in innovation activities as an indicator of industrial 
technology progress in a region. A higher growth in innovation investments suggests a 
more rapid progress in the technology capacity of a region. These types of variables are 
more remote or indirect indicators of regional economic performance than such variables 
as growth rates in GDP, trade value, and FDI. In the Appendix available upon request, we 
first enter these three potential determinants separately as the sole independent variable. 
Each of them exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on the firm-level quota 
allocation. When we put these three potential determinants together into a regression, we 
find that only the growth rate in the proportion of college graduates in the population 
produces a statistically significant positive effect. In Appendix Table 6, we add these 
three variables as additional determinants of the firm-level quota allocation into our 
earlier regressions in Tables 3 and 4, where those direct measures of regional corporate, 
macro, or information disclosure performance are major explanatory variables. The 
results show that the direct corporate, macro, or information disclosure performance 
measures keep producing positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients. 
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Growth in college graduates also produces statistically significant positive effects in 
many regressions. However, growth in the share of tertiary industry in GDP and growth 
in innovation investment often produce insignificant or negative estimated coefficients. 
These results suggest that the most direct measures of regional economic and corporate 
performance still exert the most salient impact on quota allocation. 
8.4. Checking for the Influence of Outlier Observations 
To discover whether our empirical results are affected by outlier observations, we employ 
various diagnostic tests of the sensitivity of our results to individual observations. We use 
methods such as the DFBETA influence statistics and Cook’s D to identify potential 
outliers. Then we re-run our regressions by excluding those identified potential outlier 
observations. In unreported results, we find that our regression results remain 
qualitatively equivalent to the earlier ones, which suggests that our results are not driven 
by outlier observations.   
IX. Concluding Remarks 
Introducing regulations in an economy with weak law enforcement, which is common in 
most developing and transition economies, is a challenging task. This reform will fail if 
the government is too strong that markets are suppressed or if the government becomes 
too weak to enforce regulations.  
Given that most government functions are allocated to regional governments, 
without substantial assistance from or participation of regional governments, it would be 
very hard to implement regulations in China.  The quota system is an important 
instrument in China's decentralized regulatory regimes. Through this instrument control 
rights and regulatory functions of regional governments are linked together.  
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In this paper we examine a major example of the quota system, the share issuing 
quota system, and its role in financial market regulation. We argue that the quota-based 
regulatory regime is a way to provide incentives to induce regional governments to 
cooperate and assist in implementing regulations nationwide.  Four groups of evidence 
are provided that regulatory decentralization in China's financial market has created 
incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection in stock 
issuance. We find that a firm that comes from a region with a higher quality of 
information disclosure will obtain a significantly larger stock issuance quota than a firm 
that performs similarly but comes from a region with a poorer quality of information 
disclosure.  
Our findings have some general policy implications. It is understood that reforms 
are often taking place in the second-best environment where an effective judiciary is 
absent. Under this circumstance, eradicating the existing state institutions may lead to 
disorder and disorganization (Rodrik, 2006). Our findings illustrate a relatively successful 
path-dependent reform strategy, which carries out institutional transformations based on 
the existing institutions. Another general policy implication is the role of decentralization 
in implementing reform policies. Making a reform incentive compatible for all reform 
participants is a critical condition for a reform to be successful. Decentralization may 
create conditions to solve incentive problems of economic reforms better.  
However, we want to add a caveat on the above discussion that decentralization 
works only when it is carefully implemented together with other factors. That is, 
incentives associated with decentralization in general and a quota-based regulatory 
regime in particular might not ensure successful implementations of reform policies 
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automatically. As discussed in a previous section that a quota-based regulatory regime is 
not incentive compatible with regulating IPOs of non-state-owned firms; and it does not 
fit the enforcement of some important laws/rules, such as the post-IPO information 
disclosure etc. This may shed light on the phasing out of the quota-based regulatory 
regime when those problems have become critically important.   
Furthermore, there are still some areas where quota-based regimes failed 
miserably to regulate. A major example is the land-use regulation in China (see Section 
2). Different from stock issuance quota, which is about allocating national market 
resources, land-use quota is about allocating regional resources. Although the Chinese 
national government has ultimate de jure control right over land use all over the country, 
regional governments have de facto control power over land use due to severe 
informational problems the national government faces. When a quota-based regime is 
about regulating allocation of national resources the national government has more 
control over the resources and the incentives so that the quota system works more 
effectively. However, when a quota-based regime is about regulating allocation of 
regional resources the national government loses control over the recourses and the 
incentives. Thus, it is not surprising that the quota-based regime would not work 
smoothly.  
 To conclude our paper, we summarize some general implications from our 
findings. First, creating proper incentives for government officials to implement a reform 
determines the fate of the reform. Often this has to make use of some existing institutions, 
even though part of them will be ultimately replaced in the reform. Second, properly 
designed decentralization can solve the incentive problem quite well. Regulatory 
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decentralization is an example. Finally, the success of decentralization hinges on a host of 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Growth in  0.11 a       
market capitalization (0.034)       
        
Growth in tradable  0.10 a      
market capitalization  (0.035)      
        
Growth in    0.015 d     
P/E ratio   (0.010)     
        
Growth in     0.049 b    
P/B ratio    (0.020)    
        
Growth in     0.0029 a   
market turnover     (0.0011)   
        
Growth in       0.17 b  
net profits      (0.085)  
        
Growth in earnings       0.036 b 
per share       (0.020) 
        
No. of observations 212 212 211 211 212 212 212 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
p-value of F-test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.31 
 
Panel 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall  0.015 c       
performance index (0.0087)       
        
Market   0.011 c      
performance index  (0.0062)      
        
Accounting   0.082 c     
performance index   (0.045)     
        
Growth in GDP    3.14 b    
    (1.63)    
Growth in     -0.48 d   
trade/GDP     (0.33)   
        
Growth in       0.79 b  
FDI/GDP      (0.35)  
        
Growth in        0.063  
industrial value/       (1.12) 
GDP        
No. of observations 212 212 212 232 227 220 232 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 30 31 
p-value of F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.44 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model with robust standard errors 
estimations as given in parentheses. The dependent variable in the two panels is the regional stock 
issuance quotas. There are no data on FDI into Tibet. Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. p-values for F-tests of fixed effects are 
reported. Year dummies and constant term are included in the regressions but not reported to save 
space. 
Table 2  Firm-level Quota and Regional Corporate and Economic 
Performance 
 Panel 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Growth in  0.0057 a       
market capitalization (0.0011)       
        
Growth in tradable  0.0087 a      
market capitalization  (0.0013)      
        
Growth in    0.00036     
P/E ratio   (0.00056)     
        
Growth in     0.0049 a    
P/B ratio    (0.00073)    
        
Growth in     0.00019 a   
market turnover     (0.000043)   
        
Growth in       0.0057 c  
net profits      (0.0033)  
        
Growth in earnings       0.0044 b 
per share       (0.0021) 
        
No. of observations 5664 5664 5658 5664 5664 5653 5664 
No. of firms 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
p-value of F-test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 
Panel 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall  0.0020 a       
performance index (0.00044)       
        
Market   0.0014 a      
performance index  (0.00028)      
        
Accounting   0.0089 b     
performance index   (0.0037)     
        
Growth in GDP    0.16 a    
    (0.020)    
Growth in     0.012 c   
trade/GDP     (0.0066)   
        
Growth in       0.0015 a  
FDI/GDP      (0.00041)  
        
Growth in        0.15 a 
industrial value/       (0.029) 
GDP        
        
No. of observations 5664 5664 5664 5913 5887 5846 5913 
No. of firms 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1134 1148 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 30 31 
p-value of F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.16 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model with robust standard errors 
estimations as given in parentheses. The dependent variable in the two panels is the firm-level stock 
issuance quotas. There are no data on FDI into Tibet. Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. p-values for F-tests of fixed effects are 
reported. Year dummies and constant term are included in the regressions but not reported to save 
space. 
Table 3 Regional and Firm-level Corporate Performance Indictors 
and Firm-level Quota 
Panel 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Growth in  0.0039 b       
market cap (0.0017)       
        
Growth in   0.0044 a      
tradable market    (0.0017)      
Cap        
        
Growth in    0.0011 b     
P/E ratio   (0.00045)     
        
Growth in     0.0012 a    
P/B ratio    (0.00043)    
        
Growth in     0.011 c   
Market turnover     (0.0061)   
        
Growth in       0.0054 c  
net profits      (0.0028)  
        
Growth in       0.00096 
earnings per share       (0.00090) 
Growth in firm’s 0.00017d 0.00018 d 0.00022 c 0.00023 b 0.00020 c 0.00016 0.00022 c 
net profits (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00011)  
No. of obs. 3109 3109 3109 3109 3109 3109 3109 
No. of firms  864 864 864 864 864 864 864 
No. of provinces   31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
p-value of F-test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.048 0.048 0.042 0.062 0.042 0.035 0.083 
Panel 2  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall  0.0062 b       
performance index (0.0025)       
        
Market   0.0044 b      
performance index  (0.0018)      
        
Accounting   0.0070 c     
performance index   (0.0024)     
        
Growth in GDP    0.15 a    
    (0.030)    
Growth in trade     0.012   
value/GDP     (0.023)   
        
Growth in FDI/      0.036b  
GDP      (0.016)  
        
Growth in industrial       0.046 b 
value/GDP       (0.020) 
Growth in firm’s 0.00021 c 0.00021 c 0.00027 b 0.00037 c 0.00040 c 0.00050 a 0.00040 c 
net profits (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00025) (0.00021) 
No. of observations 3109 3109 3109 3117 3117 3464 3117 
No. of firms 864 864 864 864 864 895 864 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 30 31 
p-value of F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.046 0.046 0.067 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.14 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model with robust standard errors estimations as given in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in the two panels is the firm-level stock issuance quotas. There are no data on 
FDI into Tibet. Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels 
respectively. p-values for F-tests of fixed effects are reported. Year dummies and constant term are included in the 
regressions but not reported to save space. 
Table 4  Regional Stock Market Informational Efficiency and 
Regional Stock Quota 
 
Panel 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Three-year average relative -4.97 d -7.94 b -0.36 b -0.38 b -0.49 a 
regional stock price co- (3.10) (3.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) 
movement indicator      
      
Firm fixed effects   No No Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects   No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of firms   1148 1082 1148 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 
No. of observations 215 215 5775 4811 5775 
p-value of F-test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.40 0.52 0.12 0.17 0.20 
 
Panel 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Three-year average -0.21 c -0.21 c -0.21 c -0.18 d -0.21 c   
relative regional  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
stock price co-       
movement indicator      
      
Overall regional  -0.00033      
performance index (0.0022)     
      
Three-year GDP   0.020    
growth rate  (0.030)    
      
Three-year trade/   0.0027   
GDP growth rate   (0.018)   
      
Three-year FDI/    0.020 b  
GDP growth rate    (0.0085)  
      
Three-year industrial     0.026 d 
value/GDP growth      (0.018) 
      
Three-year growth  0.00024 b 0.00024 b 0.00024 b 0.00025 b 0.00024 b 
rate in firm’s net (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
profits      
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of firms 864 864 864 856 864 
No. of provinces 31 31 31 30 31 
No. of observations 3109 3109 3109 3080 3109 
p-value of F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 
 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model with robust standard errors estimations 
as given in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1-2 of Panel 1 is the region-level stock 
issuance quota, and the dependent variable in columns 3-5 of Panel 1 and in Panel 2 is the firm-level 
stock issuance quota. Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 
15% levels respectively. p-values for F-tests of fixed effects are reported. Year dummies and constant 
term are included in the regressions but not reported to save space. 
Appendix Table 1 Data Summary 
Panel 1  Summary Statistics in Regional Level Data Analysis 
 
Variable Name # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 (region-
years) 
    
Region-level quota 237 2.70 3.24 0.057 26.60 
      
Regional overall  212 4.91 16.54 -5.65 233.98 
performance index      
      
Regional market  212 6.85 23.10 -8.08 327.80 
performance index      
      
Regional accounting  212 0.0066 2.04 -16.60 12.64 
performance index      
      
Growth in regional 212 5.37 7.23 -0.023 44.32 
market capitalization      
      
Growth in regional 212 5.64 7.25 0.15 43.18 
tradable market cap      
      
Growth in regional  211 6.32 12.21 -80.80 114.66 
P/E ratio      
      
Growth in regional  212 4.71 7.35 -6.75 45.60 
P/B ratio      
      
Growth in regional  212 12.26 112.96 -0.78 1634.15 
turnover ratio      
      
Growth in regional 210 0.33 1.50 -2.81 10.62 
net profits      
      
Growth in regional  212 -0.32 3.52 -34.73 20.80 
earnings per share       
      
Difference between 246 -0.00088 0.049 -0.15 0.19 
regional R2 and      
national average      
      
Growth in regional 232 0.55 0.41 -0.12 2.11 
GDP      
      
Growth in regional   227 0.040 0.70 -0.57 7.88 
trade/GDP      
      
Growth in regional 232 -0.13 0.27 -0.66 0.55 
industrial output/      
GDP       
      
Growth in regional  220 0.14 1.12 -0.78 8.55 
FDI/GDP      
Panel 2  Summary Statistics in Firm-level Data Analysis 
Variable Name # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 (firm-yeas)     
Firm-level quota 5913 0.17 0.29 -5.43 3.39 
      
Regional overall  5664 2.24 8.77 -5.65 233.98 
performance index      
      
Regional market  5664 3.27 12.19 -8.08 327.80 
performance index      
      
Regional accounting  5664 -0.35 2.48 -16.60 12.64 
performance index      
      
Growth in regional 5664 3.21 5.27 -0.023 44.32 
market capitalization      
      
Growth in regional 5664 3.37 4.77 0.15 43.18 
tradable market cap      
      
Growth in regional  5658 3.63 9.13 -80.80 114.66 
P/E ratio      
      
Growth in regional  5664 2.93 5.71 -6.75 45.60 
P/B ratio      
      
Growth in regional  5664 3.23 57.78 -0.78 1634.15 
turnover ratio      
      
Growth in regional 5653 0.26 1.32 -2.81 10.62 
net profits      
      
Growth in regional  5664 -0.96 4.81 -34.73 20.80 
earnings per share       
      
Difference between 4995 0.011 0.026 -0.03 0.19 
regional R2 and      
national average      
      
Growth in regional 5913 0.47 0.38 -0.12 2.11 
GDP      
      
Growth in regional   5887 0.098 0.64 -0.84 8.43 
trade/GDP      
      
Growth in regional 5913 -0.10 0.26 -0.66 0.42 
industrial output/      
GDP       
      
Growth in regional  5846 0.57 8.08 -1 149.74 
FDI/GDP      
      
Growth in firms’ 3117 0.18 20.65 -438.99 505.99 
net profits      
Appendix Table 2  Regional Governments’ Selection of State-owned 
Enterprises to be Listed in Stock Markets 
 
Panel 1  Evidence on the group of provinces and cities with quantitative state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) performance information 
 
The following table contains a summary of results about the evidence on different 
provincial governments’ selection of SOEs for listing. The dependent variable for 
regressions for all provinces is the dummy variable that takes value one if the SOE 
finally becomes a listed company and zero otherwise. 
 
Province Name SOE performance measures Year  # of SOEs Sign of estimated 
coefficient, statistical 
significance   
Anhui Industrial value per worker, Total 
sales per worker  
1991 192 +, significant 
Beijing Total sales ranking, profits and 
taxes ranking, capital profits 
ranking; (lower scores mean 
higher ranking) 
1991 100 -, significant 
Fujian Industrial value per worker, total 
sales per worker 
1991 198 +, significant 
Guangzhou 
(Guangdong) 
Enterprise ranking order (lower 
score means higher ranking) 
1991 100 -, significant 
Jiangsu Industrial value per worker, total 
sales per worker 
1991 85 +, significant 
Hainan Industrial value per worker, total 
sales per worker, profits and taxes 
per worker 
1991 53 +, significant 
Inner 
Mongolia/Baotou
Enterprise profits and taxes 
contribution per worker, net 
industrial value per worker 
1991 33 +, significant 
Jilin/Changchun Profit growth rate from preceding 
year 
1987 30 +, significant 
Jiangxi Industrial value per worker, total 
sales per worker, profits and taxes 
per worker 
1991 352 +, significant 
Shaanxi Industrial value per worker, 
profits per worker 
1993 49 +, significant 
Shandong Industrial value per worker, total 
sales per worker, profits and taxes 
per worker 
1991 181 +, significant 
Shanghai  Industrial value per worker, sales 
per worker 
1991 915 +, significant 
Shenzhen 
(Guangdong) 
Labor productivity per worker 1991 90 +, significant 
Sichuan (including 
Chongqing) 
Profits and taxes contribution 
ranking (lower score means 
higher ranking) 
1992 100 -, significant 
Xinjiang Industrial value per worker, value 
added per worker, total sales per 
worker, profits and taxes per 
worker 
1995 166 +, significant 
  
Panel 2  Case of Shanghai  
 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable that takes value one if the SOE finally 
becomes a listed company and zero otherwise. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industrial value per  2.67e-8 a  2.79e-8 a  
Worker (1.03e-08)  (1.05e-8)  
     
Sales per worker  2.93e-8 a  3.10e-8 a 
  (1.05e-8)  (1.07e-8) 
     
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
included?     
     
Log pseudo- -171.22 -170.28 -165.41 -164.51 
likelihood     
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.030 0.035 0.063 0.067 
     
Number of obs. 915 914 915 914 
 
Note: Regressions are estimated using logistic model with robust standard errors estimations 
as given in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. Year dummies and constant term are included in the 




Panel 3  Evidence on the group of provinces with qualitative SOE performance 
information 
 
Province name Year  # of  listed companies 
with manufacturing 
predecessors 
# of listed companies with excellent 
or model manufacturing 
predecessors  (%) 
Guangxi 1995 3 1   (33.3%) 
Hebei 1993 6 3   (50.0%) 
Heilongjiang 1993 7 4   (57.1%) 
Hubei 1995 11 3   (27.3%) 
Hunan 1995 12 8   (75.0%) 
Liaoning 1993 19 8   (42.1%) 
Tianjin 1993 8 6   (75.0%) 
Yunnan 1992 7 2   (28.6%) 
  
 







Type of Disclosure Violation # of 
violations 
Share 
as % of 
Total 
Share 
as % of 
Total 
IPO False Information Disclosure re 
listing 
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Others Other Reasons Other Reasons  11 4.4 4.40 
 Total  250 100 100 
Source: HE Jia et al., Chinese and Foreign Disclosure Systems Comparison and Their 
Effectiveness [Zhong-wai Xinxi Pilu Zhidu jiqi Shiji Xiaoguo Bijiao Yanjou], Table 3-5, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange Research Institute, 2002.   
  
Appendix Table 4  Alternative Measures of Quota 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall 0.0033 a     -0.0012 a  
performance  (0.00036)     (0.00040)  
index        
        
Market   0.00060 b      
performance   (0.00024)      
index        
        
Accounting   0.0019 c     
performance    (0.0010)     
index        
        
Growth in GDP    0.063 a   -0.039 
    (0.023)   (0.029) 
Growth in FDI/     0.0021    
GDP     (0.0035)   
        
Relative regional      -0.061 b -0.061 b 
stock price co-      (0.028) (0.028) 
movement         
indicator        
        
Growth in firm’s 0.000025 -0.000015 3.14e-6 -0.000014 -.000011 -7.72e-6  -9.43e-6 
net profits (0.000023) (0.000024) (.0000024) (.000024) (.000023) (.000023) (.000023) 
        
No. of obs. 5869 5869 5869 5836 5805 5861 5828 
        
No. of firms 1254 1254 1254 1254 1245 1254 1254 
        
p-value of  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test         
        
R2 0.071 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model with robust standard errors 
estimations as given in parentheses. The dependent variable, the firm-level stock issuance 
quota, is measured as the year-on-year growth rate in the number of shares issued by the firm. 
Superscripts a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels 
respectively. p-values for F-tests of fixed effects are reported. Year dummies and constant 
term are included in the regressions but not reported to save space. 
 
Appendix Table 5  Dealing with Potential Time Series Correlation  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall 0.0062 b     -0.0025   
performance  (0.0030)     (0.0027)  
index        
        
Market   0.0044 b      
performance   (0.0021)      
index        
        
Accounting   0.0070 a     
performance    (0.0025)     
index        
        
Growth in GDP    0.15 a   -0.00072 
    (0.034)   (0.034) 
Growth in FDI/     0.035 b   
GDP     (0.016)   
        
Relative regional      -0.20 d -0.19 d 
stock price co-      (0.13) (0.13) 
movement         
indicator        
        
Growth in firm’s 0.00021  0.00021 0.00027 c 0.00037 d 0.00044 d 0.00022 d  0.00022d 
net profits (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00024) (0.00027) (.00015) (.00015) 
        
No. of obs. 3109 3109 3109 3117 3088 3109 3109 
        
No. of firms 864 864 864 864 856 864 864 
        
p-value of  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test         
        
R2 0.046 0.046 0.067 0.12 0.11 0.027 0.027 
 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model. Standard errors are 
estimated by clustering around firm groups and are given in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, c 
and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. Year 
dummies and constant term are included in the regressions but not reported to save space.  
Appendix Table 6   Controlling for More Region-level Determinants 
of Stock Quota Allocation 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall 0.0096 b     0.013 a  
performance  (0.0044)     (0.0048)  
Index        
        
Market   0.0066 c      
performance   (0.0035)      
Index        
        
Accounting   0.0081 b     
performance    (0.0035)     
Index        
        
Growth in GDP    0.060 d   0.074 d 
    (0.040)   (0.046) 
Growth in FDI/     0.019 d   
GDP     (0.012)   
        
Relative regional      -0.29 c -0.24 d 
stock price co-      (0.15) (0.15) 
movement         
indicator        
        
Growth in firm’s 0.00032 b 0.00032 b 0.00043 a 0.00031 b 0.00044 a 0.00033 b 0.00031 b 
net profits (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) 
        
Growth in  -0.087 d -0.087 d 0.082  -0.13 b 0.083 -0.058 -0.12 c 
tertiary industry (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.061) (0.069) (0.073) 
share in GDP        
        
Growth in  0.018 a 0.018 a 0.012 c 0.017 a 0.010 0.018 b 0.017 b 
college graduates (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0074) 
in population        
        
Growth in  0.0043 0.0054 0.059 a 0.0074 0.060 a 0.0038 0.0078 
innovation  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
investment        
        
No. of obs. 2169 2169 2169 2169 2145 1921 1921 
        
No. of firms 902 902 902 902 894 848 848 
        
p-value of  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test        
        
R2 0.11 0.11 0.024 0.11 0.021 0.11 0.10 
 
Note: Regressions are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) model. Standard errors are 
estimated by clustering around firm groups and are given in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, c 
and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. Year 
dummies and constant term are included in the regressions but not reported to save space.  
 
